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The Impacts of 9/11
on Canada-U.S. Trade
by Steven Globerman, Ph.D.,
and Paul Storer, Ph.D.

INTRODUCTION
The 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington have had profound global
economic and political effects. One consequence of the tragedy is heightened security
concerns surrounding the movement of goods and people across international borders
that, in turn, have raised the prospects of substantial disruptions of international
trade. Within the Canada-U.S. context, numerous observers have identified increased
regulations and intensified inspection procedures at the Canada-U.S. border as contributing to significantly higher shipping costs and shipment delays. The higher costs
and associated disruptions to commercial shipments might be inferred to discourage
growth of trade between the two countries. It is now widely accepted that economic
integration between the Canadian and U.S. economies is, on balance, an important
contributor to the economic health of both economies, especially Canada’s. Developments that might attenuate the growth and “deepening” of North American economic
integration therefore threaten the economic welfare of Canadians and Americans, and
their nature and magnitude are worthy of careful analysis.
Clearly, national security has become

prove policymaking in this area.

a much more pressing policy goal in

The main purpose of this study is to

the two countries post 9-11. Neverthe-

identify the impacts of post-9/11 se-

less, policymakers need to be aware of

curity developments on bilateral trade

the costs of initiatives to promote in-

between Canada and the United States.

creased security in order to balance the

Specifically, the study provides a sta-

benefits and costs of specific initiatives,

tistical analysis of the extent to which

and eliminate (or modify) those whose

bilateral trade flows fall short of their

costs outweigh their benefits in terms

“expected” levels in the post-9/11 peri-

of improved security. Moreover, the

od. It provides estimates of trade short-

relevant costs might be capable of be-

falls for both U.S. exports to Canada

ing reduced without unduly compro-

and U.S. imports from Canada on an

mising security through a reallocation

aggregate level, as well as separately

of resources across government pro-

for the largest U.S. land ports. One key

grams, as well as within the operations

finding of the study is that both U.S.

of specific agencies. In short, a greater

exports to and imports from Canada

understanding of how post-9/11 secu-

were lower than they would otherwise

rity-related developments are affecting

have been in the post-9/11 period giv-

economic circumstances can help im-

en traditional determinants of bilateral
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trade. These export and import “short-

The study proceeds as follows. Initial-

falls” decreased in relative magnitude

ly, an overview of the growth and com-

after 2003; however, whereas the short-

modity composition of bilateral trade is

fall for U.S. exports to Canada had ef-

presented by way of background. This is

fectively disappeared by the middle of

followed by an evaluation and synthe-

2005, a significant shortfall for U.S. im-

sis of various studies that provide most-

ports from Canada continued to persist

ly indirect insights into the impacts of

through mid-2005. This finding sup-

post-9/11 security developments on bi-

ports a view expressed by some observ-

lateral trade. We then set out our own

ers that Canadian exporters have been

statistical methodology for identifying

relatively disadvantaged compared to

the impacts of 9/11 on bilateral trade

U.S. exporters by post-9/11 security-re-

flows and present quantitative esti-

lated developments.

mates of the impacts for both overall

Another empirical finding is that

U.S. export and import trade with Can-

trade shortfalls are not uniform across

ada, as well as for exports and imports

land ports at the Canada-U.S. border.

crossing through major land ports. The

Indeed, significant differences can be

conclusions from the statistical analysis

identified across ports in the extent of

are evaluated against the background

the identified trade shortfalls. For ex-

of more qualitative evidence, including

ample, whereas statistically significant

small case studies of the main trading

shortfalls in U.S. imports from Canada

industries. The study concludes with

can be identified for the ports of Blaine,

a set of policy conclusions and recom-

Champlain / Rouses Point and Port Hu-

mendations.

ron through mid-2005, the shortfalls
identified in the immediate aftermath
of 9/11 had essentially disappeared for

OVERVIEW OF
CANADA-U.S.TRADE

the ports of Buffalo and Detroit by 2003.



Further analysis suggests that differences

Canada-U.S. trade constitutes the

across ports are not obviously linked to

largest bilateral trade relationship in

differences in the mix of commodities

the world. Moreover, levels of histori-

processed through the individual ports.

cal bilateral trade flows understate the

A more plausible explanation appears

importance of a smoothly function-

to be the mix of transport modes serv-

ing border between the two countries,

ing the ports. Specifically, ports that are

since much of the production that

more intensive users of rail as a trans-

takes place in each country relies upon

port mode are more likely to evidence a

just-in-time supply of inputs shipped

persistent import shortfall.

across the border.
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Notwithstanding the large absolute

lateral trade should be observable with

volume of bilateral trade, the industrial

reference to a relatively small number

composition of traded goods is fairly

of industries.

concentrated. Looking at the value of

It should also be noted that bilateral

U.S. imports from Canada, the 15 largest

trade is concentrated in a relatively

importing industries in 2004 accounted

small number of ports. Specifically, of

for around 55% of total Canadian ex-

the estimated 75 land ports along the

ports to the United States in that year.

Canada-U.S. border, just three account

Motor vehicles alone accounted for over

for the bulk of bilateral trade. Two are

16% of the value of total U.S.-bound

at the border between Michigan and

Canadian exports. Total exports of five

Ontario (Detroit and Port Huron) and

segments of the broader transportation

one is at the border between New York

equipment sector account for approxi-

and Ontario (Buffalo-Niagara Falls). The

mately 22% of the value of U.S. mer-

concentration of commercial shipments

chandise imports from Canada. Other

at the Michigan ports is to be expected

major Canadian export industries in-

given the prominence of transportation

clude energy (oil and gas and petroleum

equipment in overall bilateral trade.

products) and forest products (wood

Furthermore, most non-motor vehicle

and paper products).

manufactured goods produced in Cana-

The industrial composition of U.S.

da originate in Ontario and Quebec and

exports to Canada is less concentrated

also cross into the United States at entry

than the industrial composition of

points in Michigan and New York.

U.S. imports from Canada. Neverthe-

The overwhelming bulk of merchan-

less, transportation equipment exports

dise shipped between Canada and the

to Canada are quite important for the

United States employs surface modes

United States. Specifically, motor ve-

of transportation, essentially truck and

hicles account for slightly more than

rail. In 2002, around 61% (by value) of

9% of all U.S. merchandise exports to

U.S. imports from Canada was shipped

Canada in 2004. Six transportation

by truck and an additional 24% was

equipment-related sectors collectively

shipped by rail. For U.S. exports to Can-

account for almost 25% of U.S. exports

ada, approximately 78% was shipped by

to Canada.

truck and 9% by rail.

by Steven Globerman, Ph.D.,
and Paul Storer, Ph.D.

For the most part, the composition of
the leading export and import sectors

PREVIOUS RESEARCH

remained fairly constant over the 1990s
and the early 2000s. The implication is

A wide range of explicit and implicit

that significant post-9/11 impacts on bi-

incremental costs has been associated



The Impacts of 9/11
on Canada-U.S. Trade
by Steven Globerman, Ph.D.,
and Paul Storer, Ph.D.

with border security procedures imple-

greater problems than they were prior

mented since 9/11. One approach to

to 9/11. Moreover, the delays and uncer-

identifying those costs involves estima-

tainties regarding crossing times impose

tion of the changes in waiting times

significant costs on shippers. Nonethe-

and the variability of waiting times

less, there is little evidence of shippers

post-9/11. A second approach involves

initiating changes in mode shipment

estimates of the incremental costs to

choice or border crossing times and lo-

shippers associated with longer and

cations in response to the border cross-

more variable wait times at the border.

ing disruptions identified. Nor is there

A third utilizes evidence on the reaction

strong evidence that the number of

of shippers to post-9/11 developments.

trucks crossing the border has declined

In particular, have shippers been willing

relative to the growth of overall eco-

to incur specific costs in order to miti-

nomic activity. In light of the fairly lim-

gate border delays and uncertainties,

ited and mixed evidence regarding the

and what are the magnitudes of the

impact of added costs on trade flows,

costs that have been willingly incurred?

additional empirical evidence on the

A fourth approach evaluates whether,

issue seems useful. To our knowledge,

and to what extent, commercial and

our study is the first that links bilateral

private vehicle border crossings have

trade flows to 9/11.

changed over time. No available study,
to our knowledge, attempts to estimate

METHODOLOGY

directly the impact of post-9/11 border
security developments on bilateral trade
flows.



The methodology followed by the
study involves the specification and

The available body of evidence sug-

estimation of U.S. export and import

gests that significant additional costs

equations. The particular specification

and delays were imposed on shippers

chosen is derived from the gravity mod-

in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Ef-

el of trade. This well-established model

forts made by the two governments to

is built around the notion that trade be-

mitigate the impacts of the disruptions,

tween any two countries should grow as

in particular the dispatching of the Na-

the size of each trading partner increas-

tional Guard to border crossings, ap-

es. Conversely, the greater the physical

parently mitigated some of the adverse

distance between any two countries,

impacts and facilitated reductions in

the greater should be the transportation

average wait times; however, it appears

costs and, therefore, the smaller the vol-

that delays and timing uncertainties as-

ume of trade. This basic gravity model

sociated with border crossings remain

is usually augmented by incorporating

The Impacts of 9/11
on Canada-U.S. Trade

other independent variables into the ex-

The general approach chosen is to as-

port and import equations, particularly

sume that the costs differ between the

relevant exchange rate relationships.

pre and post-9/11 period. One speci-

Since the basic focus of the investi-

fication incorporating this assump-

gation is on changes in bilateral trade

tion would involve the use of a single

flows over time, the specification of the

dummy independent variable that takes

benchmark gravity model focuses on

a value of zero for all quarters prior to

the main determinants of U.S. imports

the third quarter of 2001 and a value of

from and exports to Canada over time.

unity for all other quarters. This speci-

For the import equation, the dependent

fication would effectively incorporate

variable is the nominal (U.S.) dollar

the assumption that the costs of border

value of U.S. imports from Canada. One

security-related procedures increased

independent variable is nominal (U.S.)

“once-and-for-all” after 9/11. While

dollar value of the U.S. GDP. A second

this assumption cannot be ruled out au-

independent variable is the Canada-U.S.

tomatically, it seems unlikely in light of

exchange rate specified as the number of

comments made by managers and gov-

Canadian dollars per U.S. dollar. Since

ernment officials involved in bilateral

our observations are quarterly over the

trade. Specifically, it seems more likely

period 1996 (Quarter 1) through 2005

that, while costs did increase substan-

(Quarter 2) for U.S. imports, we also in-

tially after 9/11, there were periods of

clude dummy variables for the second,

time when the relevant costs decreased

third and fourth quarters of each year.

as well as increased.

1

For the export equation, the dependent

In the absence of reliable information

variable is the nominal (U.S.) dollar

about the time series behavior of securi-

value of U.S. exports to Canada. The

ty-related costs to shippers and produc-

measure of economic activity is the U.S.

ers involved in bilateral trade, it seems

dollar value of Canada’s GDP. All other

advisable to employ a general specifica-

independent variables are specified as

tion that identifies a separate time pe-

in the U.S. import equation.

riod dummy variable for each quarterly

The time-sensitive variable of most di-

observation commencing with the third

rect relevance to this study is the mag-

quarter of 2001. For example, one inde-

nitude of the explicit and implicit costs

pendent variable would take a value of

associated with security-related devel-

unity for 2001 Quarter 3 and zero for

opments. Since no such time series is

all other time periods. A second inde-

available, we must rely upon indirect

pendent variable would take a value of

approaches to identifying changes in

unity for 2001 Quarter 4 and zero for

the magnitude of these costs over time.

all other time periods, and so forth. This

by Steven Globerman, Ph.D.,
and Paul Storer, Ph.D.

Missing data limited
our time series for U.S.
exports to Canada to the
period 1997 Quarter 1
through 2005 Quarter 2.
1
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flexible specification allows the impact

is the Foreign Trade Division of the U.S.

of time on the dependent variable to

Bureau of the Census. The Bureau’s un-

vary between time periods post 9/11.

published database identifies exports

This approach seems more appropriate

and imports for every U.S. port of en-

than “forcing” specific time patterns on

try with commodity detail provided at

the data in the absence of strong theo-

the 5-digit SITC level. Data for the inde-

retical reasons for assuming one or an-

pendent variables were obtained from

other more specific pattern.

Statistics Canada (Canadian GDP), the

Several other issues are relevant in

U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (U.S.

specifying the export and import equa-

GDP) and the Federal Reserve (Canada-

tions. One is whether the independent

U.S. exchange rate).

variables should be specified as contem-

In the initial estimated model, the

porary or entered with a lag structure.

import and export equations are esti-

It is reasonable to expect that changes

mated over the period 1996 Q1 through

in overall economic activity and the ex-

2001 Quarter 2. The goal was to identify

change rate will influence exports and

an economically and statistically reli-

imports with a lag, and other research

able model to serve as a “benchmark”

suggests that the lags can be as long as

specification to which the time series

six quarters. Again, rather than impos-

variables would be added for samples

ing an a priori lag structure, alterna-

that include data from after the second

tive lags for the GDP and exchange rate

quarter of 2001. The parsimonious U.S.

variables are specified, and a selection

import equation performs quite well. In

is made based upon which lag provides

this model, the natural log value of U.S.

the best statistical results. A second spec-

imports from Canada is a function of

ification issue is whether the dependent

the natural log value of U.S. GDP, the

variable and one or more independent

Canada-U.S. exchange rate, the season-

variables should be specified as linear or

al dummy variables, and a set of port

log-linear terms. Both theoretical con-

dummy variables that identify the 10

siderations, as well as empirical results,

largest U.S. ports through which Cana-

support the inclusion of the dependent

dian imports pass. The estimation results

variables and the GDP variables in log

for the U.S. export equation are not as

form.

satisfactory as for the import equation.
In particular, the exchange rate coeffi-

DATA SOURCES
AND STATISTICAL RESULTS

cient often takes the “wrong” sign. Nevertheless, the overall goodness of fit of
the export equation is quite good and

The source of data for the trade flows



seems acceptable to use as a benchmark
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model to which the time series variables

are the estimated coefficients for the

can be added.

time dummy variables for each period.

The preferred specifications of the

The peak shortfall for U.S. imports from

import and export equations estimated

Canada was 2003, when U.S. imports

over the period through 2001 Quarter

were almost 26% below the level that

2 were then re-estimated over the full

would have been expected based upon

sample period adding the quarterly time

pre-9/11 experience. By the first half of

dummy variables described earlier. The

2005, U.S. imports from Canada were

goal was to identify whether the time

around 12% lower than what would be

series variables are statistically signifi-

expected from the experience over the

cant and, if so, the size of their effects. A

period 1996 Quarter 1 through 2002

significant post-9/11 impact is suggest-

Quarter 2. This result implies that total

ed by time series plots shown in Figures

imports from Canada were almost U.S.

1 and 2. Specifically, the data summa-

$12 billion less than they would other-

rized in these charts show a downward

wise have been through the first half of

movement in both imports and exports

2005. While we cannot with certainly

between 2001 and 2002, although the

ascribe this result entirely to 9/11, we

movement is more evident in the case

did make an effort to rule out other ob-

of U.S. imports from Canada.

vious causes of this trade shortfall.

When the time dummy variables are

In a manner similar to aggregate im-

included in the import equation and the

ports from Canada, the coefficients for

equation is estimated over the full time

the time dummy variables were estimat-

period through 2005 Quarter 2, the most

ed for U.S. exports to Canada over the

salient result is the negative pattern of

full sample period. The estimated pat-

coefficients for the dummy variables.

tern of coefficients for the time dummy

Specifically, all of the coefficients for the

variables indicates that the negative im-

time dummy variables are negative and

pact of post-9/11 developments on U.S.

statistically significant. This result indi-

exports to Canada increased between

cates that U.S. imports from Canada in

2001 Quarters 3 and 4 and then de-

the post-9/11 period were below levels

creased consistently, at least for several

that could have been expected holding

versions of the model. In other versions

constant macroeconomic determinants

of the model, there was a very modest

of trade, as well as seasonal influences

increase in 2003 followed by a consis-

on trade. The import “shortfall” for

tent decrease. As Table 2 shows, this ear-

each time period following 9/11 is sum-

ly pattern for 9/11 impacts on exports

marized in Table 1. The estimated per-

is similar to that estimated for imports.

centage shortfalls in each period shown

One apparent difference between the
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Table 1: Estimated Import Shortfalls Following 9/11
Time Period

Percentage Shortfall

2001 Quarter 3

8.6%

Dollar Amount Shortfall
(U.S. Dollars)
$5.2 Billion

2001 Quarter 4

21.4%

$10.8 Billion

2002

19.4%

$10.3 Billion

2003

25.8%

$13.7 Billion

2004

17.5%

$10.4 Billion

2005 (first 2 quarters)

12.2%

$11.4 Billion

Table 2: Estimated Export Shortfalls Following 9/11
Time Period
2001 Quarter 3

18.0%

Dollar Amount Shortfall
(U.S. Dollars)
$5.5 Billion

2001 Quarter 4

22.8%

$8.2 Billion

2002

19.8%

$6.8 Billion

2003

15.8%

$7.3 Billion

2004

3.9%

$1.4 Billion

2005 (first 2 quarters)

Percentage Shortfall

(5.8% increase)

import and export equations is that the

($2.5 Billion increase)

the 2005 period.

estimated coefficients for the years 2004

Besides estimating the impacts of

and 2005 are statistically insignificant

9/11 on overall imports and exports,

in the U.S. export equations, thereby

we estimated similar models for the ten

suggesting that border congestion ef-

largest U.S. land ports for trade with

fects had apparently “disappeared” for

Canada. Graphing the data for imports

northbound commercial shipments by

and exports at the individual port level

the end of 2003. In contrast, statistical-

suggests that the experiences of the in-

ly significant negative impacts on U.S.

dividual ports are not identical (see Fig-

imports from Canada persisted through

ure 3). Our regression analysis revealed
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that, for imports from Canada, the

significant negative impact on imports

overall pattern of the estimated time

from Canada can be identified for High-

period variables is fairly similar across

gate Springs, Buffalo/Niagara Falls and

the different ports, with the notable ex-

Pembina. In sum, whereas all of the

ceptions of Detroit and Buffalo/Niagara

sample ports experienced a substan-

Falls. Specifically, the smallest impact

tial and statistically significant import

was typically experienced in Quarter 3

shortfall at some point in the post-9/11

of 2001. The impact increased in Quar-

period, only about half of the largest

ter 4 of 2001 and then remained fair-

ports were still experiencing a signifi-

ly constant until either 2003 or 2004

cant negative shortfall by the end of the

when the negative impact on trade was

first half of 2005.

most pronounced for six of the ten top
ports.2

Highgate Springs, Sweetgrass and Blaine are ports
exhibiting larger negative
impacts on imports in
2005 than in 2004.
2

10

The U.S. export equation for the full
time period was then estimated for each

While the pattern of the coefficients

of the ten largest ports in a similar man-

for the time dummy variables is simi-

ner to the import equation estimation.

lar across ports in the import equa-

Much greater variation in the pattern

tions, there are also clear differences

of estimated coefficients for the time

across ports in the magnitudes of the

dummy variables was observed in the

estimated coefficients for the individual

case of the individual port export equa-

time dummy variables. For example, in

tions than in the comparable import

2005, imports from Canada through

equations. For example, for some ports,

the port of Detroit were actually higher

the negative impacts of post 9/11 de-

than “predicted” by the import equa-

velopments decrease between 2003 and

tion. At the other extreme, the Ports

2005, whereas for others they increase.

of Champlain/Rouses Point and Port

Differences across ports with respect

Huron were characterized by relatively

to the estimated coefficients for indi-

large import shortfalls based on the re-

vidual time periods are substantial. For

gression analysis. In the cases of these

example, statistically significant export

latter two ports, imports in the first half

shortfalls are identified for the ports of

of 2005 were on the order of 25% below

Sweetwater, Alexandria Bay and Cham-

the levels that would be expected based

plain/Rouses Point, but not for Highgate

upon the pre-9/11 experiences. Import

Springs, Buffalo/Niagara Falls, Blaine,

shortfalls of around 20% are identifiable

Portal, Detroit and Port Huron.

for the ports of Alexandria Bay, Portal

In summary, significant differences

and Sweetgrass. In the case of Blaine,

appear to exist across ports with respect

an import shortfall of around 13% is

to the estimated trade shortfalls in the

estimated. Conversely, no statistically

post-9/11 period. This finding hints at

The Impacts of 9/11
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a potentially important policy infer-

identified by our statistical model? The

ence. Namely, efforts to ease border

most prominent sector in this regard is

disruptions associated with security-re-

transportation equipment. A concern

lated procedures may be more efficient-

here is that offshore sourcing of parts

ly undertaken by focusing them on the

and assembled vehicles displaced North

individual large ports exhibiting the

American production, particularly pro-

greatest lingering trade shortfalls. We

duction in Canada, thereby contrib-

shall shortly discuss our efforts to iden-

uting to reduced bilateral trade in the

tify the reason(s) for the different port

post-9/11 period; however, the evidence

experiences.

suggests that the competitive challenge

by Steven Globerman, Ph.D.,
and Paul Storer, Ph.D.

from foreign producers was manifested

INTERPRETING THE RESULTS

not so much in terms of increased imports from outside North America, but

While shortfalls in U.S. exports to

rather in increased sales from foreign-

Canada are estimated to have essentially

owned plants, particularly Japanese-

disappeared by mid-2005, import short-

owned plants, within North America.

falls have apparently persisted. More-

Furthermore, available information does

over, the estimated import shortfalls are

not support a claim that Canadian au-

large, both in the aggregate as well as

tomotive sector producers were less ef-

for specific individual border crossings.

ficient than their U.S. counterparts such

Indeed, our results point to more sub-

that more production would take place

stantial adverse impacts on U.S. imports

in the United States, thereby displacing

from Canada than have been suggested

imports from Canada. Rather, the op-

by other studies, to date. It is therefore

posite seems to be true, i.e., producers

appropriate to consider whether other

in Canada enjoyed a significant produc-

phenomena may have adversely affected

tivity advantage over their U.S.-based

U.S. imports from Canada in the post-

counterparts.

9/11 period that may not be captured
effectively in our statistical model.

Another prominent trade sector is oil,
gas and petroleum products. Oil and gas

An evaluation of this possibility in-

are primarily transported by pipeline,

volved focusing on the trade sectors

and it is, therefore, extremely unlikely

that are particularly important quanti-

that any decline in Canadian exports of

tatively in the bilateral context with the

these products could be attributable to

following question in mind: were there

border security-related developments.

any developments unrelated to border

On the other hand, tanker trucks are an

security that might have contributed to

important mode of transport for petro-

the post-9/11 Canadian import shortfall

leum products and, therefore, might be

11
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Figure 3: Imports and Exports by Port (in millions of US $)
Alexandria Bay (Port 0708)
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Figure 3 (Cont.)
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adversely impacted by border crossing

for forest products exports from Cana-

disruptions. In the context of bilateral

da to the U.S. to be seriously disrupted

energy trade, a significant reduction in

in the post-9/11 period by the dispute

the price of petroleum products might

surrounding softwood lumber exports

lead to a measured decrease in Canadian

from Canada. The Softwood Lumber

exports of petroleum products unrelat-

Agreement expired in March 2001 and

ed to post-9/11 developments. Howev-

was followed by a significant increase

er, after declining slightly in 2001 and

in shipments of softwood lumber for

early 2002, an index of petroleum prod-

Canada to the United States. The U.S.

uct prices increased consistently from

Department of Commerce levied a pre-

late 2002 through 2005, thereby miti-

liminary countervailing duty against

gating the potential relevance of energy

lumber imports from Canada in Au-

price reductions as a cause of the im-

gust 2001 followed by an anti-dumping

port shortfall from Canada. In addition,

duty. These duties remained in place (at

there is no basis for arguing that U.S.-

different values) over the post-2001 pe-

based importers substituted petroleum

riod. It must be acknowledged that the

product imports from outside North

duties imposed by the U.S. government

America for imports from Canada.

may have kept physical volumes of Ca-

As in the case of petroleum products,

nadian lumber below what they other-

the value of bilateral trade in metals and

wise would have been in the post-9/11

metal products might be affected either

period. In this regard, however, it might

by changes in the average prices of those

be noted that the absolute volume of Ca-

products or because shipments of those

nadian softwood lumber exports to the

products from outside North America

United States actually increased in 2003

displace bilateral trade. Again, these

and 2004 reflecting strong U.S. housing

possibilities do not appear relevant.

construction activity. Moreover, Cana-

Specifically, price indices for base met-

da’s share of the U.S. softwood lumber

als, after decreasing in 2001 and early

market was relatively stable from 2002-

2002, subsequently increased. Indeed,

2004. In any case, a decrease in softwood

the increases in 2003 and 2004 were

lumber exports is unlikely to have con-

quite substantial ranging from a low of

tributed substantially to the estimated

20% for aluminum to a high of 72% for

shortfall in U.S. imports from Canada,

lead. These data suggest that decreases

since less than three percent of Canada’s

in metal prices cannot plausibly con-

total commodity exports to the U.S. are

tribute to the estimated Canadian im-

comprised of softwood lumber.

port shortfall in the post-2002 period.
Finally, we considered the potential
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major bilateral trading sectors, particu-

and uneven policy convergence.

larly from the perspective of Canadian

The first approach is envisaged to in-

exports to the United States, does not

volve the implementation of a border

provide strong grounds for concern that

security perimeter in which commer-

we have unwittingly overlooked factors

cial shipments and travelers entering

contributing to estimated trade short-

the North American “space” would face

falls while ascribing the consequences

security screening at the point of en-

of those factors to increased border se-

try. Once cleared to enter, shippers and

curity and its associated costs. Further-

other travelers could cross the Canada-

more, while we are unable to offer any

U.S. border presumably without the

definitive explanations of the observed

need for additional security evaluation.

differences across ports in estimated

A model of a common external perim-

trade shortfalls, our analysis rejects the

eter is the European Union’s Schengen

notion that the differences are primar-

Agreement. This agreement includes

ily a consequence of differences in the

common visa and asylum policies, a

commodity compositions of shipments

shared information system and stan-

passing through individual ports. Rath-

dardized border procedures. Adoption

er, differences in trade shortfalls at the

of a Schengen-type approach to creat-

port level more likely reflect differences

ing a North American border security

in conditions surrounding the infra-

perimeter seems unlikely in the current

structures of the ports, as well as in pro-

political environment. Perhaps the most

cedures followed at the various ports.

prominent reason is that Canadian offi-

by Steven Globerman, Ph.D.,
and Paul Storer, Ph.D.

cials see the harmonization of visa and

POLICY CONCLUSIONS

related immigration policies as meaning
that Canada must conform to U.S. poli-

Two broad approaches towards ad-

cies, and they are reluctant to do so.

dressing the simultaneous need for bor-

If a total harmonization of security

der security and the relatively free flow

policies on a bilateral basis is neither

of commercial shipments have been

practical nor (perhaps) desirable, what

identified. One encompasses the bilat-

specific initiatives might be consid-

eral harmonization of border security

ered? This question is obviously quite

policies along with a pooling of sover-

open-ended, since there are a myriad

eignty to build a formal North Ameri-

of potential initiatives that might be

can security perimeter. A second, less

considered ranging from the relative-

ambitious approach, involves a mixture

ly mundane, e.g., increase personnel

of enhanced cross-border security coor-

working at surface border crossings, to

dination and collaboration with partial

the futuristic, e.g., develop and deploy
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inspection technologies that can cheap-

not be surprising if similar differences

ly and accurately confirm the content

could be identified for land ports on

of cargo shipments, as well as confirm

the Canadian side. While there are clear

the identities of drivers. It is impossible

advantages to standardizing border se-

to make recommendations at detailed

curity procedures across all ports, there

levels of specificity; however, several

is a strong case for allowing individual

general observations can be offered.

ports some leeway to differentiate strat-

One broad observation is that econom-

egies and tactics to safeguard commer-

ic incentives should be implemented to

cial shipments from terrorist actions

encourage investments in technology

while permitting those shipments to

to facilitate more efficient and effective

flow freely across the border.

security screening procedures. For ex-

Finally, and notwithstanding our ear-

ample, shippers might be “risk-rated” by

lier skepticism about the practicality

governments on the basis of the speed

and desirability of full integration of

and reliability of the information that

border security procedures on a bilat-

the shippers provide to government of-

eral basis, it is clear that coordination

ficials regarding their cargos and ship-

of infrastructure investments by gov-

pers. Risk ratings might also be based on

ernments on both sides of the border is

the intrinsic terrorism hazards posed by

imperative if infrastructure investments

the cargo being shipped, as well as the

are to be effective. For example, capac-

ports through which they are shipped.

ity expansions on one side of the bor-

Risk ratings might, in turn, be used to

der may have minimal impacts on the

assess “user fees” applied to shippers

actual speed and consistency of ship-

that would presumably be passed along

ping times if bottlenecks on the other

to final consumers. The fees collected

side persist. Moreover, there are likely

from shippers would, in turn, be used

to be significant cost savings by har-

for public investments in physical in-

monizing the timing of infrastructure

frastructure and technology deployed

investments on each side of the border.

at the border to help provide secure and

In this regard, investments being under-

expeditious border crossings.

taken under the auspices of the Govern-

A second broad observation is that

ment of Canada’s Border Infrastructure

border security policies might acknowl-

Fund seem an appropriate approach, as

edge relevant differences in conditions

they involve cooperation on the part of

and circumstances at individual border

federal, provincial and local authorities

crossing locations. While our results

including operators of bridges and tun-

identified differences in border crossing

nels that provide rights of way to ports

conditions across U.S. ports, it would

on either side of the border.

Research Report No. 1
July 2006
Border Policy Research Institute
Western Washington University
Bellingham, Washington
www.ac.wwu.edu/~bpri/

